NATO weakened from within by the US plays directly into Putins sticky pudgy fingers. Is this the underlying end game? US in in decline and wants to endure by being the top dog in its own hemisphere. With the US holding all the technology cards, despite NATO and other partners contributing to it on US terms, the EU currently does not have the capability of limiting Russian, or China's aggression. Middle powers have slightly more economic influence than the majority of other nation states but as their manufacturing bases have been eroded over recent decades, in a China, Russia, US divide up, that influence is limited. Even if/when the eventual hemispherical carve up occurs, and the EU wins out over Russia, would the EU itself survive the cultural divisions or quickly slide into chaos. Would the European heritage within the US insist they protect Europe from China? And what part will India play?
Doc Martin, let me try to answer your question in a more systematic way.
The starting point is technology. Despite all the rhetoric about American dominance, the United States does not currently control the most important choke-point of 21st-century power: advanced semiconductor manufacturing. The bulk of the world’s cutting-edge chips still come from Taiwan via TSMC. Washington understands this vulnerability, which is why it has pushed TSMC and others to build fabs in the US, but those plants are years away from operating at scale. Until then, America’s “tech sovereignty” is aspirational rather than real. In any serious crisis involving China and Taiwan, this dependency becomes a strategic nightmare for Washington.
Europe, meanwhile, has latent power that it still fails to convert into geopolitical weight. Economically and technologically, the EU has everything it needs to be a major independent pole in world politics. The problem is political: it does not yet behave like a unified strategic actor. Without a common foreign, security and industrial policy, Europe cannot fully defend its interests or project power. But if it ever does develop that spine, a technologically sophisticated and wealthy EU would dwarf a demographically shrinking, resource-dependent Russia. Moscow’s leverage over Europe is not structural; it is a product of European disunity.
This is where the idea of “middle powers” becomes crucial. Whatever form Trump’s second presidency ultimately takes, the US will not find it easy to impose a simple vassal system on the world. Countries like India, Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, and even parts of Europe are too large, too rich and too strategically complex to be reduced to obedient satellites. Over the next couple of years, you are likely to see more coordinated and assertive middle-power diplomacy, as these states hedge against both Washington and Beijing. India in particular — with its size, economy, and civilisational self-confidence — is almost guaranteed to resist being folded into any Trump-style hierarchy.
On China and Europe, I think the outlook is bleaker than many in Brussels assume. A Trump administration will not risk American blood or treasure to defend European interests against China. That does not mean Washington will become pro-Beijing; it means Europe is simply not a priority. In a transactional, America-first worldview, Europe is a rich competitor, not a ward to be protected. Europeans who assume that NATO automatically extends to a US–China confrontation are likely to be badly disappointed.
Australia, unfortunately, has made its own strategic bet very explicit. By doubling down on the US alliance, hosting American forces, and tying critical minerals like rare earths into US-centric supply chains, Canberra has locked us more deeply into Washington’s orbit than at any time since the Second World War. That gives us protection, but it also removes room to manoeuvre. We are no longer even pretending to be a balancing power in Asia; we are a forward base of the American system. Whether that turns out to be wise will depend entirely on how volatile and coercive that system becomes under Trump.
So the picture that’s emerging is not a simple US-versus-China bipolar world. It’s a fractured landscape: a technologically anxious United States, a potentially powerful but politically hesitant Europe, an opportunistic China, and a growing bloc of middle powers trying to preserve their autonomy in between. That is where the real geopolitical drama of the next decade will play out.
No worries Martin. I seem to be making my profession into a full time hobby as well. Perhaps I should get a train set!! I don’t know whether this will lead to burnout but I’m enjoying the experience so far.
NATO weakened from within by the US plays directly into Putins sticky pudgy fingers. Is this the underlying end game? US in in decline and wants to endure by being the top dog in its own hemisphere. With the US holding all the technology cards, despite NATO and other partners contributing to it on US terms, the EU currently does not have the capability of limiting Russian, or China's aggression. Middle powers have slightly more economic influence than the majority of other nation states but as their manufacturing bases have been eroded over recent decades, in a China, Russia, US divide up, that influence is limited. Even if/when the eventual hemispherical carve up occurs, and the EU wins out over Russia, would the EU itself survive the cultural divisions or quickly slide into chaos. Would the European heritage within the US insist they protect Europe from China? And what part will India play?
Where does that leave your country?
Doc Martin, let me try to answer your question in a more systematic way.
The starting point is technology. Despite all the rhetoric about American dominance, the United States does not currently control the most important choke-point of 21st-century power: advanced semiconductor manufacturing. The bulk of the world’s cutting-edge chips still come from Taiwan via TSMC. Washington understands this vulnerability, which is why it has pushed TSMC and others to build fabs in the US, but those plants are years away from operating at scale. Until then, America’s “tech sovereignty” is aspirational rather than real. In any serious crisis involving China and Taiwan, this dependency becomes a strategic nightmare for Washington.
Europe, meanwhile, has latent power that it still fails to convert into geopolitical weight. Economically and technologically, the EU has everything it needs to be a major independent pole in world politics. The problem is political: it does not yet behave like a unified strategic actor. Without a common foreign, security and industrial policy, Europe cannot fully defend its interests or project power. But if it ever does develop that spine, a technologically sophisticated and wealthy EU would dwarf a demographically shrinking, resource-dependent Russia. Moscow’s leverage over Europe is not structural; it is a product of European disunity.
This is where the idea of “middle powers” becomes crucial. Whatever form Trump’s second presidency ultimately takes, the US will not find it easy to impose a simple vassal system on the world. Countries like India, Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, and even parts of Europe are too large, too rich and too strategically complex to be reduced to obedient satellites. Over the next couple of years, you are likely to see more coordinated and assertive middle-power diplomacy, as these states hedge against both Washington and Beijing. India in particular — with its size, economy, and civilisational self-confidence — is almost guaranteed to resist being folded into any Trump-style hierarchy.
On China and Europe, I think the outlook is bleaker than many in Brussels assume. A Trump administration will not risk American blood or treasure to defend European interests against China. That does not mean Washington will become pro-Beijing; it means Europe is simply not a priority. In a transactional, America-first worldview, Europe is a rich competitor, not a ward to be protected. Europeans who assume that NATO automatically extends to a US–China confrontation are likely to be badly disappointed.
Australia, unfortunately, has made its own strategic bet very explicit. By doubling down on the US alliance, hosting American forces, and tying critical minerals like rare earths into US-centric supply chains, Canberra has locked us more deeply into Washington’s orbit than at any time since the Second World War. That gives us protection, but it also removes room to manoeuvre. We are no longer even pretending to be a balancing power in Asia; we are a forward base of the American system. Whether that turns out to be wise will depend entirely on how volatile and coercive that system becomes under Trump.
So the picture that’s emerging is not a simple US-versus-China bipolar world. It’s a fractured landscape: a technologically anxious United States, a potentially powerful but politically hesitant Europe, an opportunistic China, and a growing bloc of middle powers trying to preserve their autonomy in between. That is where the real geopolitical drama of the next decade will play out.
Thank you Dr. John for taking time out in your busy schedule to formulate such a comprehensive response.
No worries Martin. I seem to be making my profession into a full time hobby as well. Perhaps I should get a train set!! I don’t know whether this will lead to burnout but I’m enjoying the experience so far.
Let me get back to you later on these very interesting questions!